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Operation Boulder, a United States government surveillance program
deployed in 1972 under the direction of then-President Richard M. Nixon,
launched a large-scale federal investigation of both Arab immigrants to the U.S.
and Arab-Americans.1 In this context, the term “Arab” is used to mean a person
originating from an Arabic-speaking country in the Middle East or North Africa,
while “Arab-American” refers to a person of Arab lineage who was born in the
United States. For the purposes of this paper, the Arabs and Arab-Americans
referred to are only those residing in the United States. Before the project was
canceled due to its overuse of resources, Operation Boulder led to the
investigation of 150,000 Arabs.2 During the operation, government agents
employed invasive and discriminatory tactics in their investigations of Arab
immigrants and Arab-Americans. Further, a combination of historical evidence
and contemporary analysis indicates that these federal investigations intended to
suppress and divide Arab communities. However, though the U.S. government
was able to dampen community activity initially, their surveillance tactics
ultimately resulted in mobilization and cooperation within the Arab community in
the U.S., resulting in a strengthened ethnic and cultural identity.
U.S. GOVERNMENT TACTICS
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A collaboration between United States government agencies employed a
wide variety of tactics to intimidate, harass, and surveil Arab-Americans. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Central Intelligence Agency, Internal Revenue Service, State Department, and
U.S. Customs Service collaborated on a large-scale investigation targeting Arabs
in America, both immigrants and Arab-Americans. The initial tactic used to ramp
up surveillance in the early stages of Operation Boulder was a tightening of
immigration and visa requirements: the United States government required Arab
immigrants and Arab-Americans who travelled internationally to obtain transit
visas. Though government officials originally promised that these regulations
would only affect those suspected of terrorism, the restrictions were applied to
Arabs writ large, regardless of their criminal history. This spillover indicated a
future trend of ostensibly innocent immigrants and Arab-Americans being
surveilled and targeted based on their national origins alone. Travel and
immigration restrictions soon expanded beyond a simple requirement for special
visas: Arab immigrants began to face extra screening when trying to enter the
United States, which resulted in some visa requests being denied. Further,
government agents utilized this additional screening as an opportunity to uncover
small technical errors in the previously approved visa applications of Arabs now
living in the U.S. The discovery of these errors was used as justification to deport
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Arab immigrants, though such technical inconsistencies had previously been
overlooked in immigration processes.3
U.S. government agencies also employed more invasive tactics in their
investigation of Arabs living in the U.S. For instance, in the case of the Arab
attorney Abdeen Jabara, government officials used wiretaps as part of “an
intensive harassment campaign” that lasted nine years.4 Further, officials also
aggressively questioned Arab-Americans, even those not suspected of any crime.
FBI officers made practice of arriving at the homes of Arab-Americans in the
early hours of the morning and demanding that Arab-Americans submit to an
interrogation immediately, often justifying their actions to subjects and their
families with false statements that the person being questioned was suspected of
involvement in an anti-United States organization. The government officials also
used exploitative tactics during interrogations, such as lying to detainees and
telling them they would not need a lawyer. Finally, the U.S. government even
went so far as to organize burglaries to steal intelligence on investigation targets.
For instance, the FBI carried out a burglary on the office of a leader of the Arab
Information Center and allegedly stole the names of the Center’s agents.5 Federal
use of exploitative tactics to gain information about the U.S. Arab community
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sowed fear among Arab immigrants and Arab-Americans and provided federal
investigators with an ever-growing pool of targets.
JUSTIFICATION OF TACTICS
The United States government justified its surveillance of Arab-Americans
by asserting that this oversight was necessary to protect the security of U.S.
citizens of Israeli background.6 Government officials bolstered this claim by
pointing to the “Palestinian commando action” that occurred at the 1972 Olympic
games in Munich.7 At the Olympics, a Palestinian terrorist group took members of
the Israeli Olympic team hostage, killing some and then engaging in a firefight
that left the remainder of the Israeli athletes dead.8 Representatives of the U.S.
government argued that the Munich attacks could be attributed to “Arab history
and tradition of extremism and violence which has contributed the word assassin
to the international lexicon.”9 Therefore, officials posited, surveillance of ArabAmericans was necessary to prevent Munich’s violence from being replicated on
U.S. soil.
However, both data available in the early 1970s and the information that
emerged from Operation Boulder indicate that the above justifications lack merit.
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In 1972, there were no acts of terrorism that were verified as having been
perpetrated by Arab-Americans, suggesting that there was no precedent for the
U.S. to initiate such an extensive domestic surveillance program.10 In addition,
through every investigation that was instigated under Operation Boulder, zero
violations of United States law were ever discovered.11 Because the surveillance
campaign was both groundless and fruitless, contemporary and current minority
advocates argued that other motivations had given rise to Operation Boulder.
TRUE MOTIVATIONS
Pro-Israeli movements likely contributed to the perpetration of Operation
Boulder, though the U.S. government preferred to emphasize the national security
justifications for the surveillance program. The timing of a Zionist information
campaign against Arab immigrants provides support for the assertion that the U.S.
utilized Operation Boulder to strengthen its ties to pro-Israeli advocate groups.
Shortly before the surveillance operation was launched, Zionist organizations
based in the United States warned authorities that Palestinians associated with
Arab guerilla warriors could be among the immigrants and Arab-Americans
pursuing education in the United States. Around the same time, Near East Report,
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a Zionist lobbying organization, publicly reported that Arab students were
circulating Palestinian “propaganda” in the U.S.12 As the operation progressed,
the United States government explicitly acknowledged that it was collaborating
with the Israeli government on Operation Boulder, and domestic Zionist groups
such as the Jewish Defense League boasted close involvement with the
surveillance campaign.13 In additional, bidirectional information exchanges
between pro-Israel lobbies and U.S. government officials reinforced the political
motivations behind Operation Boulder. Up to two years before the operation was
launched, U.S. government officials sought information on Arab political
activism, and some of the first sources they turned to were U.S.-based Zionist
organizations.14 Conversely, as Operation Boulder progressed, government
agencies often provided American pro-Israel groups with information on
prominent Arab-American political activists.15 Evidence of communication and
collaboration between U.S. officials and Zionist groups aligns with the logic of
the situation: pro-Israel forces would, naturally, want Palestinian activists in the
U.S. to be surveiled. Intelligence gathering on Arabs would benefit the Israeli side
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by providing insider insight into Arab political
activism and strategy. Further, the fear of prosecution by U.S. officials likely
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deterred Arab-Americans from political activity, which would benefit the Israeli
side of the political equation.
Suppression of Arab political activity was also a prominent, though
unspoken, goal of Operation Boulder. Arab-Americans engaged in political
activity with the goals of influencing both domestic and foreign policy, as
liberalizing immigration laws convinced many Arab-Americans that “interest
group politics” could lead the U.S. to pursue a “more even-handed approach to
the Middle East.”16 Organizations such as the National Association of ArabAmericans focused on pressing the U.S. government to back Palestinian interests
in the Middle East. They believed that tolerance for Arabs abroad would spill over
to expanded rights for Arab-Americans.17 Other political groups focused on
improving the welfare of Arabs in America, and they pursued this goal by
engaging in the political process and rising within the government.18 The United
States, partially because they backed Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
did not want pro-Palestinian forces pressuring them or rising in their ranks,
supported the suppression of this political activity. Michael Fischbach posits that
surveillance was used first to scope out, then to flatten, the Arab-American
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political landscape. He notes that U.S. government surveillance focused on the
extent of the associations between Arab-Americans and “Arab political
organizations abroad.” In-person surveillance and interviews that took place in
Arab enclaves allowed the FBI to gather information on the political atmospheres
and leaders of certain communities. Fischbach suggests that the U.S. government
was deeply concerned about Palestinian influences on U.S. politics and society,
writing, “[T]he latter concern, that of Arab viewpoints reaching American ears,
was of equal concern as alleged security threats.” 19 Michael Suleiman argues that
tactics such as early-morning visits and interrogations were intended to create a
“chilling effect,” and that they “intended to intimidate and silence political debate
about Middle East issues.”20 The focus on politically active Arabs instead of any
actual perpetrators of violence combined with the imposing tactics employed
suggests that U.S. government interests were political, not security-related.
Further, the surveillance’s focus on discovery of more targets and its failure to
uncover any evidence of legal violations by Arabs in the U.S. indicate that the
core goal of Operation Boulder was creating enough fear to suppress, or chill,
Arab political activity.
Another clandestine objective of Operation Boulder consisted of
destroying Arab networks of internal community support: government officials
19
20

Fischbach, "Government Pressures," 87-90.
Suleiman, "Islam, Muslims," 41.

162

used targeted tactics in order to entice Arab-Americans to turn on one another,
effectively deconstructing communities. For instance, when U.S. officials visited
Arab-Americans’ houses and demanded to begin interrogations, they questioned
not only their target but also the family and friends of the target. This mode of
questioning encouraged Arab-Americans to report any possible wrongdoings of
their own close relations, as well as shifting blame and resentment towards the
original target for supposedly causing the poor treatment enacted by government
officials.21 Younger Arabs faced even further pressure to report the activities of
those they knew due to the career- and life-altering threat of being deported
before obtaining a university degree.22 Via these tactics, U.S. government officials
intended to build up a “network of informers” to assist their investigations.
Government agencies intended not only to separate communities in order to
inhibit the formation of political momentum, but also to alienate Arab-Americans
involved in politics from the rest of the Arab-American community that formed
their possible support base.23 Operation Boulder’s aims to undercut community
ties serve as another method of creating a chilling effect, as the destruction of
communities tends to inhibit mobilization towards political activity.
Some separation of communities did happen through Operation Boulder’s
successful cultivation of a network of informants. A number of Arab-Americans,
21
22
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either because they did not know the law or because they believed they had
nothing to hide, complied with illegal lines of questioning and implicated people
close to them, leading to a cycle of more and more illicit interrogations.24 As a
result of intimidation tactics applied by the federal government, pressure and
subsequently shame circulated about the Arab-American community and threated
to close down Arab-focused sources of scholarship. For instance, many university
cultural and intellectual programs that studied the Middle East faced pressure to
close down due to the intense scrutiny being applied to their activities and those
of their scholars. The assumption that Arab scholarly views were unreliable or
unsound stemmed from the U.S. government’s concerted effort to discredit proArab political views, and this doubt decreased the scholarship produced by the
Arab-American community.25
However, though something of a chilling effect was achieved, the U.S.
government ultimately failed in tearing apart Arab-American communities:
overall, political mobilization and community cohesion resulted from Operation
Boulder. Originally, the generation of Arab-Americans and Arab immigrants that
was affected by Operation Boulder lacked a substantial ethnic identity. Instead,
the most prominent characteristic shared by Arab-Americans in the 1970s was
their assimilation into American culture, and most Arab-American communities
24
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held only fractured pieces of their cultural identities.26 As a result, most ArabAmericans shared few characteristics with one another and experienced a general
separation. However, Michael Fischbach writes that this disconnect was
overcome by the Arab-American response to Operation Boulder: Arab
organizations and Arabs in the U.S. banded together to protest the surveillance as
a form of discrimination and a violation of rights.27 The community response was
characterized by an unprecedented cooperation between political, social, and
cultural Arab organizations. For instance, members of the Association of ArabAmerican University Graduates (AAUG) published an ad in the New York Times
condemning Operation Boulder as discriminatory. Even Arab organizations that
had never before engaged in political activities and did not focus on MiddleEastern issues, such as Arab-American social clubs, attached their names in
support of the advertisement. Elaine Hagopian attributes this change to the
organizations’ perceived “responsibility to the community,” suggesting that the
events of Operation Boulder connected organizations to new causes and created a
cohesive Arab-American community.28 Other organizations took on roles beyond
their original intentions in order to help foster and protect the Arab-American
community. For instance, the members of the AAUG with legal training formed a
committee on civil rights to combat illegal harassment. Although the AAUG
26
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never intended to be a body that dispensed legal advice, the pressure exacted by
the U.S. government motivated AAUG members to pool resources and provide
services to the Arab-American community.29 Changes such as those that occurred
within the AAUG indicated organizations’ willingness to expand beyond their
original missions in the service of the broader Arab community, suggesting more
community cohesion and cooperation.
Overall, the U.S. government deployed surveillance tools under Operation
Boulder in a targeted effort to appease Zionist interests by destroying ArabAmerican political activity and community networks. Though some degree of a
chilling effect did occur, the discriminatory practices perpetrated by Operation
Boulder eventually led a previously fractured and disconnected immigrant group
to band together in solidarity, create resilient social and political networks, and
formally protest the actions of the U.S. federal government.
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